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Ill THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES ERIHN ALEXANDER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16025 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant and a codefendant were charged with aggravated 
kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty by the Court on April 17, 1978, 
of the charge of aggravated sexual assault in violation of 
Section 76-5-405 (l) (a) (ii), Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction on the 
basis he acted under coercion due to threats of violence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant and a codefendant, Luther Lee Cook, were 
arrested and charged with having committed the crimes of 
aggravated kidnapping and aggravated sexual assault. 
Defendant Cook plead guilty to the charge of aggravated 
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sexual assault, and at the time of appellant's trial, was in 
custody of the Division of Corrections for the purpose of 
undergoing a 90-day evaluation. Cook testified for the 
State at appellant's trial and admitted having committed 
the rape. 
On April 17, 1978, appellant, having waived the jury, 
was tried by the Court on the charge of aggravated sexual 
assault. Testimony was offered, by appellant and the victim, 
to the effect that both appellant and the victim were threat-
ened with death or serious bodily harm by codefendant Cook 
at the time of the commission of the crime. No evidence was 
offered to indicate that appellant himself actually raped the 
victim. 
The Court found appellant guilty on the basis he aided 
and abetted Cook in the commission of the sexual assault. 
The charge of aggravated kidnapping was dismissed on the basis 
of the single criminal episode rule. Appellant was committed 
for a 90-day evaluation and subsequently sentenced, on a 
reduction to a second degree felony, to one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT ;:',CTED UNDER COERCION OF IMMINENT 
PHYSICAL FORCE AND THREAT OF FORCE TO HIS 
PERSON AND TO T:iE PERSON OF THE VICTnl 
Section 76-2-302, Utah Code .~notated (1953) as amended, 
provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense 
-2-
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when he engaged in the proscribed conduct because 
he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened 
imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him 
or a third person, which force or threatened force 
a person of reasonable firmness in his situation 
would not have resisted. 
The key element in the foregoing provision for purposes 
of this appeal is that the force or threatened would not have 
been resisted by a person of reasonable firmness "in his (the 
defendant's) situation". 
Thus, the standard set forth is a subjective one, i.e., 
the situation is to be viewed from the perspective of the 
defendant. In the instant case, the defendant was shown to 
have suffered from both hypoglycemia and a bleeding ulcer at 
the time the rape occurred. The testimony of Dr. White 
indicated appellant had been hypoglycemic for some years and 
was admitted to a hospital, shortly after his arrest, for 
treatment of a bleeding ulcer. 
Dr. lfuite further testified at trial to the effect that 
both of the foregoing physical conditions could cause weakness, 
dizziness, nausea, loss of memory and disorientation--in short, 
the very sym<:)toms • . ;hich defendant testified, and the victim 
corroborated, he was suffering from on the date of the crime. 
Appellant's physical state on the date in question signifi-
cantly impaired his volitional ability. His will to resist 
codefendant Cook's threats of violence was diminished. Appell-
ant contends that any reasonable person in appellant's physical 
and mental condition at the time the crime occurred would not 
have resisted the threats of force by Cook. 
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The victim of the rape herself testified that appellant 
was ill at the time the crime was committed. In fact, she 
remained at the scene to assist appellant even after Cook 
had left. (Rec. on App., pp. 65-66) Further, the victim 
confirmed that appellant allowed her to leave the scene 
and even directed her so as to avoid Cook in the event 
he werereturning. (Rec. on App., pp. 68-69). 
Both appellant and the victim had their lives threatened 
by Cook. The victim stated she overheard Cook threatening 
to kill appellant if he refused to assist him in the commiss-
ion of the cri:ne. ?e:::. :;n App., p. 57). 
The current Utah statute on compulsion and coercion has 
not been authoritatively construed by the Utah Supreme Court. 
However, the fo~er statute was construed in the case of 
State v. Pearson, 15 Utah 2d 353, 393 P.2d 390 (1964). In 
that case, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the claimed 
coercion or threat o= fcrce must be immediate, not merely 
speculative. 
In the instant case, the evidence clearly indicates 
that numerous threats of irmninent violence •>~ere made by Cook , 
from the initial threat to shoot the victim if she refused to 
cooperate, through the threat to kill appellant if he refused 
to assist in the crime. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT ACTED PEASONABLY IN "lOT 
RESISTING THE THREATENED CSE OF FORCE, 
vJHETHER REAL OR .:\.PPARENT 
In the situation in which appellant f~und himself, he 
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acted reasonably for the protection of himself and the victim 
from further serious harm and possible death. 
Appellant maintains the standard to be applied to his 
conduct is whether or not the threatened use of force created 
a ~ondition of real or apparent danger of physical harm. 
Thus, if appellant had reasonable ground to believe, and actually 
did believe, his life and the girl's were in apparent danger, 
then he acted within the law in allowing the crime to be 
committed. Such would be the case even if it were later 
established that the danger of harm was not real or actual. 
It is the appearance at the time of the events which is signi-
ficant. 
~he doctrine of apparent necessity has been applied in 
a line of Colorado cases dealing with self-defense claims. 
In Chacon v. People, 488 P.2d 56 (1971), the Supreme Court 
of Colorado, in following an earlier decision of Young v. 
People 107 P. 274 (1910), stated: 
A person who is in a situation where it 
appears that he is in real danger has the right 
to act upon appearances, even though such appear-
ances may prove to be deceptive. 488 P.2d at 57. 
Appellant herein urges that the same rationale should 
be applied to one who is coerced into assisting in the 
commission of a felony in the belief that to resist the 
apparent use or threat of force would result in harm to 
himself or further harm to the victim of the felony. 
Thus, appellant could be excused for not risking his 
life and the victim's life to prevent the rape by Cook. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant contneds the evidence at trial was insufficient 
to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charge 
of aggravated sexual assault. The evidence of appellant's 
physical and mental condition at the time the crime occurred, 
coupled with the evidence of threats of force by Cook, corrobo-
rated by the victim, established a presumption that appellant 
acted under coercion in aiding and abetting Cook. ':C'hat pre-
sumption was not sufficiently =ebutted. 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant urges this Court 
to reverse his conviction. 
DATED this .:.:- .J_ day of February, __ 1,_9 7 9. 
---:;> 
---- ------,~~~~-----------
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Richard G, MacDougall 
'-- -
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify I delivered two copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, 
this ~t\ day of February, 1979. 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
